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1. Introduction
An article on the Commission’s role in EU Treaty reform
may require some justification. Treaty reform, most
commonly pursued through Intergovernmental Confe-
rences, is perceived to be intergovernmental, the preserve
of Member State representatives. The Commission, itself
the creation of the EU’s founding treaties, is working
within an institutional framework that changes with
every instance of Treaty reform. As such it is generally
regarded as the object, not the subject of Treaty reform.
There is, however, much more to the Commission
and Treaty reform, as this article seeks to demonstrate.
The Commission lacks formal powers to play a full role
in IGCs – it is clearly not a 16th Member State – but that
does not mean that it is absent from these proceedings.
Proper analysis of Treaty reform requires a focus on
supranational actors, and with it a study of the Com-
mission’s activity in this arena.1
More importantly
for the purposes of
this article, studying
the Commission’s in-
volvement in EU
Treaty reform provi-
des us with new in-
sights into the way in
which the Commis-
sion may extend its
prerogatives and participate in an area of EU politics
which has tended to be dominated by the projection of
Member State interests.
The Commission’s practice of extending the limits
of its influence in the EU policy-process are now fairly
well established. Throughout the history of the EU, the
Commission has pursued strategies of policy-entre-
preneurship, utilising a variety of unique resources at its
proposal, and thus managing to expand the EU’s range
of competences and thus its own place in the heart of the
Union.
2 While there is ample evidence of such policy-
entrepreneurship, it has occurred on the whole in areas
of EU politics which privileged the Commission, such
as environmental policy, social policy or research policy,
where Member States were willing to accept its leadership
and ultimately sanctioned the gradual extension of EU
competences. There remains a stark contrast between,
on the one hand, the Commission’s role – and its
traditional ability to extend that role – in the EU policy
process, and, on the other hand, its involvement in what
can be seen as the constitutional politics of EU Treaty
reform.
Before going into the details of the Commission’s
involvement in this area, a preliminary comment on the
current phase of integration needs to be made. The
Commission is widely regarded as being at a low point
in its ability to shape EU politics.3  Three years of turmoil
after the forced resignation of the Santer Commission
have weakened some
parts of the Commis-
sion, sapped staff mo-
rale more generally
and distracted the
Commission from its
traditional role of
providing strategic
leadership together
with the European
Council. Internal reforms, intended to generate efficiency
and legitimacy gains in the long run, remain unfinished
and have turned out to be more cumbersome and complex
than initially anticipated (Metcalfe 2001). In the mean-
time, the ongoing changes have caused as much confusion
and disruption as they may have helped the Commission
to become more responsive and accountable.
Thus we are witnessing a period in the EU’s evolution
where neither Treaty reform nor the Commission’s
activities are following traditional patterns. More than
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ever, the EU and its institutions present moving targets
to the analyst. The political scene has changed
considerably – even since Nice – and the Commission
now struggles to find Member States willing to defend
its position in the institutional framework. Former allies
such as the Italian and German Governments have taken
a more intergovernmentalist position. This article will
therefore combine an analysis of past developments in
this area with the (re)conceptualisation of the
Commission’s changing role and an outlook towards
the future evolution.
The article starts by discussing the formal and
informal arrangements of Treaty reform, with a view to
positioning the Commission within a wider institutional
structure that provides it with a voice, if not a vote, in the
reform process. On the basis of such a re-conceptua-
lisation, which takes issue with some of the general
assumptions about the structure of Treaty reform, the
subsequent section then address the key questions arising
from the Commis-
sion’s role in this field,
such as: how does the
Commission organise
its internal machinery
to manage its parti-
cipation in Treaty re-
form, and how effec-
tive are these internal
arrangements? How
does the Commission
seek to influence the
various stages of EU
Treaty reform (agen-
da-setting, decision-
making, ratification/
legitimation)? In which ways is the Commission’s role
in Treaty reform changing as the EU is turning to new
modes of reforming the EU such as the Constitutional
Convention? Taken together, the answers to these
question provide a novel perspective on the evolving
role of the Commission in the constitutional politics of
the European Union.
2. Re-conceptualising Treaty reform:
The role of supranational actors
As indicated above – indeed, as implied in having a
article of this kind in the first place – Treaty reform can
and should be seen as more than simply the meeting
place of Member State interests and the bargaining
among state representatives.
It is worth emphasising that over the past decade
Treaty reform has become a constant and key item on the
EU’s agenda. From rare incidences of reform in the past,
Treaty reform has been turned into an almost continuous
process, where one stage of reform directly feeds into the
next stage, as evidenced by the post-Nice process
following on almost seamlessly from the completion of
the IGC 2000. Thus, Treaty reform has become a policy-
arena, with the appendages of a policy-making commu-
nity, technical experts, the need for institutional memory
and an element of path-dependency in the deliberations
about reform.4 It remains, of course, the key arena for
constitutional choice in the EU, and an area to which
Member States attach the highest importance. But it
should be noted that it is also an area which has deve-
loped in a way that provides new and interesting perspec-
tives for the study of the involvement of supranational
actors, and in particular of the Commission and Council
Secretariat, in the field of Treaty reform.
The key observation here is that Treaty reform is more
than the highly publicised and politicised bargaining of
the summit meeting concluding an Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC). Any such summit is indeed an
important – perhaps even the important – event in the
course of any IGC. But the IGC is much more than that,
comprising of different phases which in turn, as discussed
below, provide actors with different opportunities and
constraints. IGCs have tended to last at least a year, and
the agenda setting, and ratification processes which add
further periods of
negotiation before
and after that.
To mention agen-
da-setting and ratifi-
cation is to raise ques-
tions about the way
in which the business
of an IGC links to
other events and
decisions surroun-
ding it: how is the
IGC agenda set? How
is the ‘need’ for an
IGC established?
How does the IGC
relate to the ‘everyday’ business of the EU? How are its
results presented to the wider public, and how are these
accepted? How are unresolved issues dealt with? The
answers to these questions all point to the continuity of
EU Treaty reform. The need for EU reform, for example,
arises from an assessment of the way in which EU
institutions perform, or do not perform, within the current
legal framework, especially in the perspective of an ever
increasing number of EU Member States. If governments
believe that they can improve the effectiveness of the
EU through changes in the Treaty provision, a case for
an IGC will be made. Battles over the IGC agenda will
be fought among both state and non-state actors in the
EU, but the past performance of the existing legal
framework will inevitably have to be part of this
assessment. Treaty reform thus depends on the existing
policies and institutions – just as the results of Treaty
reform may change the dynamics of policy-making, the
policy-process itself informs the decisions made in the
course of Treaty reform. IGCs and EU policy-process are
closely intertwined.
One of these is the question of the ‘institutional
memory’ of Treaty reform. If IGCs are connected to
previous instances of Treaty reform – and indeed linked
to the day-to-day policy-process – then it matters whether
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actors are able to provide the memory of how past
decisions have been reached, how they were meant to be
interpreted, how certain issues may be resolved and
which compromise solutions have, in the past, worked,
and which have not. This involves both procedural
questions and substantive issues that are the subject of
IGC negotiations.
Together with the Council Secretariat,5 the Commis-
sion is well-placed to play that role. The Presidency,
formally charged with chairing meetings, and expected
to act as a broker in the negotiations, is unlikely to have
performed the same tasks in a previous IGC, given how
rarely Member States
occupy this position.
And in any Member
State, whether hol-
ding the Presidency
or not, electoral and
political changes as
well as fluctuation
within the diplomatic
service is usually
much greater than the
continuity in per-
sonnel terms which both the Commission and Council
Secretariat bring to the table of negotiations. Many of
those involved in the Commission have been key officials
in previous Treaty negotiations.
The Commission also brings a particular kind of
‘technical’ expertise to the negotiations. Due to its role
in implementing, or monitoring the implementation of,
Treaty provisions, it has a pivotal role in advising IGC
participants on which decisions would constitute
workable solutions and which ones would not. While
individual Member State delegations have particular
interests in specific Treaty provisions, the Commission
has over-arching responsibility for the application of
EU law, and with this responsibility comes an infor-
mation advantage vis-à-vis national administrations
that provides the Commission with an authority with
respect to the technical advice its contributes to the
negotiations.
Implicit in this assessment is a recognition of the
different levels on which IGC negotiations are being
conducted.6 A distinction can be drawn between the
political level – usually sub-divided into ministerial
level (the meeting of foreign ministers) and the Heads of
State level (the European Council meetings which
launch and conclude IGCs) – and the administrative
level. The latter is constituted by the regular meetings,
and indeed the constant inter-action, of the ‘personal
representatives’ of the Heads of State or Foreign
Ministers. It is at this administrative level that much of
the technical detail is discussed and issues are being
decided. The Commission, with resources such as its
institutional memory and its technical expertise, can
play an effective part in the negotiations, which may be
in contrast to the limelight of the endgame, where the
Commission’s role is much more limited.
All this points to the recognition that the crucial
factor with respect to the Commission involvement in
IGC negotiations is its cooperation with other actors,
namely the Presidency and the Council Secretariat.
Each of these three roles, acting in the defence of the
common interest of the Union, makes a distinctive
contribution to the IGC, but their ultimate influence
depends on their ability and willingness to co-operate
and to pool their resources. Thus, a Presidency that is
willing to involve the Council Secretariat and Commis-
sion in its search for compromise is more likely to lead
the negotiations effectively. In the same vein, a
Commission that is prepared to concentrate on the ‘low
politics’ of detailed
legal provisions
rather than on the
grand political batt-
les is more likely to
get its way. And the
Council Secretariat
and Commission,
who have been oppo-
sing forces with res-
pect to a number of
IGC decisions in the
foreign policy field, can work together on other issues
in order to lead the IGC towards supranational rather
than intergovernmental solutions.7
3. The Organisation of the Commission’s
Participation in Treaty Reform Negotiations
The European Commission is both a political actor and
a technical advisor in the context of the IGC process.
This means that the contributions of the Commission
vary between political contributions adopted by the full
College and technical clarifications submitted directly
to the conference by the services of the Commission.
The initial contribution of the Commission normally
attempts to set the political framework for the IGC and
more often than not calls on the IGC to adopt a more
ambitious agenda. This paper has tended to come before
the formal opinion that the Commission submits to the
Conference. These have always been approved by the
Commission and have led to extensive debate in Heads
of Cabinet and full Commission meetings.
The College also adopts the official opinion sub-
mitted by the Commission before the start of the IGC.
This has traditionally been a short political text, a good
example being the opinion presented before the Single
European Act that was issued on 22 July 1985 although
this approach was changed for Nice as the Commission
felt it should adopt a detailed set of proposals following
the limited Presidency reform submitted to the Helsinki
European Council in December 1999. During the nego-
tiations, a range of specific contributions are forwarded
to the Conference. Each of the main proposals are always
approved by the College. These can range from proposals
on the hierarchy of norms (1991), the co-decision proce-
dure (1996) to issues such as the European Prosecutor
(2000) or a framework for the new provisions on freedom,
security and justice (1996).
The crucial factor with respect to the
Commission involvement in IGC
negotiations is its cooperation with
other actors, namely the Presidency
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The dynamics of an IGC with its daily negotiating
and intense schedule of meetings mean that the College
can only really provide political guidance on the general
approach to be taken in the negotiations. It is therefore
left to the Commissioner (or in the case of the Convention
on the Future of Europe, Commissioners Barnier and
Vitorino) to take the political responsibility for the
positions taken in the negotiations. As in the present
case, this has occasionally led to conflict with other
Commissioners who would prefer a different position to
be taken. Other parts of the Commission are involved in
the process with the
appointment of spe-
cial correspondents in
each Directorate
General, but these are
normally limited in
their influence on
proceedings as they
are only consulted on
their specific area of
competence.
For the most re-
cent Intergovernmen-
tal Conferences, a
special Steering Group has been convened to oversee
the work of the IGC team and ensure that the Commission
negotiators take an agreed line at each meeting. The
Steering Group is normally composed of the key actors
on institutional affairs in the Commission. The vast
majority of contributions, non-papers and background
notes that are submitted by the IGC negotiators of the
Commission are approved by the Steering Group under
the political authority of the respective Commissioner.
The proposed briefing for IGC meetings is prepared by
the IGC team and submitted to the Steering Group which
normally meets a couple of days before an IGC meeting.
The line to take is rarely altered, but it is an important
opportunity for strategic decisions and a choice of
options to be taken. As the negotiations reach their
conclusion, the Steering Group tends to take on more
significance.
The IGC negotiating team of the Commission has
become a complex animal to analyse. The reality is that,
as with all delegations, it rarely acts as a single entity.
It is not unusual to have a situation whereby slightly
different emphasis is placed on an individual point by
each of those present at the negotiating table, or in the
seats at the back of the negotiating room.
Over time, the problem of internal co-ordination has
become acute for the Commission. With the steady
increase in the number of Commissioners, institutional
reform, which was once the preserve of the President, has
now also become the responsibility of a specific
Commissioner. In the case of the preparations for IGC
2004, President Prodi and Commissioners Barnier and
Vitorino are involved while there is also a formal role for
the Secretary General and Director of the institutional
affairs team. At the negotiating table, in addition to the
President and Commissioners, the Commission normally
has space for 4-5 officials.
This situation ensures there is quite a complex
structure of reporting for the IGC team. The Head of the
IGC Task Force or unit normally falls under the
administrative responsibility of the Secretary General.
However, the main day-to-day political authority is
exercised by the Cabinets of the President and the
Commissioner(s). This is actually relatively simple in
terms of structure, but not always as easy when it comes
to coordinating a series of competing viewpoints. The
IGC team has always been one of the most sought after
and dynamic posts
within the Commis-
sion. The team is
normally hand-
picked, and the majo-
rity of those chosen
are senior officials
with a wealth of pre-
vious experience on
institutional affairs.
There is always an
emphasis placed on
continuity. Since the
Single European Act,
the choice of members for the team has always ensured
that experience of the previous IGC is present. The size
(and name) of the team has varied. For the Single
European Act, Maastricht and Nice the team was
extremely small with a select group of 3-4 officials, most
of which were already members of the institutional team
in the General Secretariat. For Amsterdam and the
preparation for IGC 2004, the institutional team of the
General Secretariat has been reinforced into a Task
Force of 8-10 officials. As with the Council Secretariat,
but unlike Member State delegations, this experience
ensures the institutional memory of the Conference. Of
the vast array of issues being debated by the Convention,
nearly all have been debated previously by the
Commission and the IGC team has prepared extensive
briefing papers and through the assistance of the
Commission’s Legal Service, legal advice on each of the
options.
4. The Commission’s Role in the Treaty
Reform Process
For these reasons it is impossible to look at the
Commission as one single entity in the negotiations. It
is also incorrect to portray the influence of the
Commission within one set of negotiations based on the
assessment of the Commission’s political leadership
alone. An example of this is the focus on the weakness
of President Santer at Amsterdam and President Prodi at
Nice which has coloured the actual analysis of the role
and influence of the Commission in these negotiations.
The reality is that each set of negotiations is unique in
terms of their own dynamics, circumstances and
personalities. The same is true of the amount of influence
that the Commission can exercise on the negotiations.
A better way of assessing the role of the Commission is
The Commission has tended to be
rather effective in setting the agendas
of each set of negotiations, especially in
the preparatory groups that have met
to define the agenda and have a first
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to look at the different stages of the negotiations and
compare the differences in each with the recent sets of
negotiations.
4.1 The agenda-setting phase
The Commission normally has three opportunities to
influence the agenda-setting phase. First, as do all
delegations, the Commission regularly tries to define
the agenda of the next stage of Treaty reform during the
final phase of negotiations of the Treaty. Second, the
Commission has always been present in the preparatory
or reflection groups that have been convened to discuss
the IGC agenda. This has been either in the context of
representatives or in the Secretariat of the group in
question. And, third, the Commission seeks to influence
the debate through its official opinion to the IGC in
accordance with Article 48 TEU.
Towards the end of an IGC negotiation, attention
tends to turn towards whether further Treaty changes are
necessary and more
importantly whether
a next “rendezvous”
should be stated in
the Treaty. In
Maastricht (Article
N(2)), Amsterdam
(Protocol 7 on the
institutions with the
prospect of enlarge-
ment and declaration
N° 32 of Belgium,
France and Italy), and
Nice (Protocol on the
institutions in the
perspective of enlar-
gement) a rough agenda was already envisaged. The
Treaties of Maastricht and Nice even fixed a specific
date for the next negotiations. The Commission has
always supported these calls, partly because of its
viewpoint that Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice have
not met the requirements of an enlarged Union. The
Commission has also sought, and often succeeded in
influencing the drafting of these clauses.
During the lead-up to the Single European Act, the
Commission had both a member on the Dooge Committee
and an official placed in the Secretariat. Before
Maastricht, Jacques Delors chaired the ‘Wise Group’ on
Monetary Union but the political union element was not
covered by a preparatory group. For Amsterdam, the
Reflection Group chaired by Carlos Westendorp set
much of the agenda for the IGC and Commissioner Oreja
had very good links with his Spanish counterparts even
if his influence within the Group was more limited.
During the preparation for the Treaty of Nice, the
Commission struggled to influence the debate during
the German and Finnish Presidencies, partly because the
preparation was undertaken by an extension of Coreper
2 (EC Ambassadors). The Commission even resorted to
the establishment of a Group of Wise Men headed by
Jean-Luc Dehaene in an attempt to raise a number of
issues it felt it could not itself propose. For the Con-
vention on the Future of Europe, the Commission has
been able to appoint two Commissioners and both sit on
the Praesidium which does the bulk of the preparation
for the meetings of the Convention. However, the strong
leadership of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the personalities
involved and the general shift of positions by a number
of key Member States has meant that the Commission
has struggled to gain a foothold in these negotiations.
The only formal right that the Commission has in the
IGC process is to submit an opinion before an IGC is
convened (Article 48 TEU). That said, an interesting
legal question exists on whether an IGC could begin
without a Commission – or for that matter European
Parliament – opinion being received. The Commission
has tended to vary its approach to this opportunity in
recent years. For the Single European Act the Commission
issued a short political opinion (22 July 1985) setting
out the key political lines for the institutional frame-
work for adoption by
the forthcoming IGC.
For Maastricht the
Commission issued
an extremely detailed
opinion (21 August
1990) which set out
the framework for the
Treaty provisions on
economic and mone-
tary union and then
followed this up with
a formal opinion on
the establishment of
a political union (21
October 1990). For
Amsterdam, the Commission adopted a detailed report
on the operation of the European Union (10 May 1995)
and then adopted a short political text as its formal
opinion (28 February 1996). At Nice, the Commission
did the reverse, adopting a short political statement on
10 November 1999 and then a detailed technical formal
opinion on 26 January 2000. These reports and opinions
have varied in quality and in influence on the process.
The Commission has always defended the need for an
ambitious approach to Treaty reform. In the Dooge,
Delors, Westondorp, IGC 2000 representatives group
and the Convention on the future of Europe, the
representatives of the Commission have tended to call
for the IGC agenda to be widened and the level of
ambition to be increased. This in essence is the role of
the Commission and inevitably the final result tends to
be less than what the Commission has demanded.
4.2 The decision-making phase
It is difficult to describe accurately the decision-making
process in an Intergovernmental Conference. Indeed, it
is rare for participants to even pinpoint exactly when a
specific decision was decided or finally agreed. This is
in part due to the reality that in the negotiations “nothing
is agreed until everything is agreed”. The opaque nature
The relative decline in influence
of the President of the Commission
in the European Council is
most clearly demonstrated by
the lack of impact on the
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of negotiations and the multiple layers of decision-
making also add to the difficulty in explaining how
decisions were taken. Each delegation produces a
different set of minutes and different nuances and
interpretations of what was discussed and agreed.
Trying to analyse the influence of any one delegation
must be set against this background. Even ignoring the
limits of confidentiality imposed on those involved in
the negotiations, tracing an individual proposal from
formation to inclusion in the final Treaty demonstrates
that it is extremely rare for a Member State or the
Commission’s proposal to be adopted without debate or
amendment. The one exception being the declarations
submitted by delegations at the end of the Conference
which are often annexed to the Treaty.
The Commission has achieved varying degrees of
success when it has presented proposals or sought to
influence the decision-making process. This has very
much depended on the specific dynamics of the different
negotiations, the personalities involved and the policy
area being discussed. As an Intergovernmental Confe-
rence normally meets at four levels: Heads of State and
Government, Foreign Ministers, Personal Represen-
tatives and “Friends of the Presidency” the influence of
the Commission is also different.
The Commission has been most effective when the
discussions have concentrated on the Community area
of policies as in the Single European Act, Maastricht
(IGC on EMU) or Amsterdam (employment, environment,
social policy, public health, consumer protection). The
Commission has tended to struggle to influence debates
on common foreign and security policy, not least because
it is not able to use previous experience in the area to
justify change. However, the proposals of the Commis-
sion at Amsterdam on the transfer of sections of the
Justice and Home Affairs pillar to the Community area
do demonstrate that the Commission can still exercise
influence on classical intergovernmental matters.
On the issues of power such as the size of the
Commission, the number of votes in the Council and
number of members of the European Parliament, the
Commission cannot claim to have seriously affected the
final outcome of negotiations. In particular this has been
the case at Maastricht and Nice and in the debates of the
Constitutional Convention. However, the Commission
has still had a notable impact on general institutional
questions like the rationale behind the extension of the
co-decision procedure (Amsterdam) and the framework
and justification for the extension of qualified majority
voting (all recent IGCs).
When the negotiations have taken place at the level
of the Personal Representatives or the various Friends of
the Presidency groups on specific issues (e.g. Court of
Justice during the negotiations at Nice) or indeed in the
working groups of the Convention on the Future of
Europe, the Commission has tended to be more effective.
This is partly due to its knowledge of the issues and the
ability of its representatives to provide the technical
detail on the development of policies and how decisions
have been taken.
In recent years, the Foreign Ministers level of the
IGC proceedings has been unable to exercise effective
influence over the negotiations. This is in part due to its
undefined role between the Personal representatives
and Heads of State and Government levels. At these
meetings the Commission is normally represented by
the President and Commissioner(s) responsible for the
IGC negotiations.
The role of the Commission President in the Euro-
pean Council (and Commissioners) receives the most
focus in the different assessments of the influence of the
Commission on Treaty reform. This is in part due to the
controversy that has surrounded the role of President
Delors in the negotiations for the Single European Act
and the Maastricht Treaty. The relative decline in
influence of the President of the Commission in the
European Council is most clearly demonstrated by the
lack of impact on the Amsterdam and Nice negotiations
in the final European Council. However, this picture is
still too simplistic. It is not possible to gauge the
influence of the Commission at the final European
Council as many of its proposals are also supported by
other delegations. It is often collective pressure that
provokes the final compromise and all delegations have
varying degrees of impact on the final text. It should also
be noted that although it is argued that the Commission
is at its weakest in an IGC context in the final European
Council, the Commission is the only delegation apart
from the Council Secretariat which is entitled to have
officials present in the negotiating room. This leads to
a reporting position and to the dependence of other
delegations, which in itself can have an influence on the
nuances of the final compromise texts.
4.3 Ratification and legitimation
The Commission has no formal role during the ratification
of a Treaty stemming from an Intergovernmental
Conference. However, it has become almost expected
that the Commission will support the outcome of the
negotiations and make public pronouncements in
support of ratification. This can leave the Commission
in a difficult position in a number of ways.
Firstly, the Commission is expected to support the
final compromise even though it does not have a final
vote on its content. Within an hour after the end of
negotiations, the Commission together with the
Presidency then gives a press conference at the end of the
European Council. The President of the Commission
must, after quickly consulting with his advisors, make
an immediate comment on the final text and the prognosis
of the Commission in terms of ratification. This does not
cause significant difficulties if the new Treaty is perceived
to have further increased integration, but this is not
always as clear-cut. The situation was particularly
difficult for the Commission at the Nice European
Council where only two hours previously the Com-
mission had seriously considered rejecting the
compromise on the negotiating table. The outcome of
the Convention seems to put the Commission President
in a similarly awkward position.16 Eipascope 2003/3 http://www.eipa.nl
If on the other hand, the Commission is too fulsome
in its praise for the Treaty and its ratification, it can lead
to accusations of attempting to influence the ratification
process. Criticism was made of President Delors during
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and President
Prodi during the ratification of Nice. In addition, during
the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the
Commission was threatened with legal proceedings by
the “no campaign” in Ireland due to the distribution of
a brochure on the Treaty.
In fact, the Commission has a responsibility to
publish material on the working of the European Union
and the changes made when the founded treaties are
amended. This ensures that the Commission must be
involved in a small way in the general information
provided during a ratification process. However, the
onus must be on the Member States to explain the Treaty
to their citizens and justify their actions during the
negotiations, not least to ensure that the new Treaty is
not seen as being imposed by Brussels. Unfortunately,
much still remains to be done on this final point.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission also
has an influence – whether inadvertently or not – over
the fate of the ratifi-
cation of a Treaty revi-
sion through contro-
versial decisions it
may take (or decide
not to take) in the
policy-process, or
even more statements
made in other con-
texts. A case in point
was the negative assessment made by the Commission
of Irish economic policy in the context of the EMU
stability pact, and the impact that this is considered to
have had on the initial ‘no’ vote in the first referendum
on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. To the extent to which the
Commission will want to ensure a safe passage of
ratification instruments, it will be well advised – and
presumably is under much pressure – to avoid ‘rocking
the boat’ during such a sensitive period. Thus, the
positive influence of the Commission on ratification
may by definition not be visible to the outside observer.
5. IGC 2004 and beyond:
the changing nature of Treaty reform
At the Nice European Council in December 2000, the
Member States not only agreed on changing the EU’s
Treaty base, but also agreed a ‘post-Nice process’ which
was to lay the foundation for further, and more far-
reaching, Treaty changes in the foreseeable future. The
most important innovation in this respect has been the
creation of a European Convention charged with
preparing the work of the subsequent IGC. This new
‘convention approach’ to Treaty reform has led to a
much wider public debate in the media, a debate that
crucially has taken place before the IGC itself has
commenced. In other words, the position of national
governments on EU reform are now exposed to public
scrutiny before decisions are made and a new Treaty is
signed, rather than leaving such scrutiny and debate to
the aftermath and the ratification of an already agreed
Treaty.
The wider significance of the Convention method
remains to be seen. However, based on the experience so
far, some valuable observations with regard to its impact
on the role of the Commission in the process can already
be made. First a more detailed look at the Commission’s
involvement in the Convention is required. Among the
102 members of the Convention were two Commission
representatives (which may not seem to be a strong
representation in such a deliberative forum), but these
two Commissioners were also members of the 12-strong
Praesidium, which is where most of the key decisions
affecting the work of the Convention have been made.
Furthermore, the Convention Secretariat, which has had
an influential role behind the scenes in assisting the
Convention President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to
prepare meeting agendas and draft articles of the
proposed Draft Treaty for a Constitution, was staffed
with Commission and European Parliament as well as
Council Secretariat officials – in contrast to the practice
of recent IGCs where
the Council Secre-
tariat had been solely
responsible for assis-
ting the Presidency.
The Commission,
like Member State
representatives, did
not have a strong role
within the plenary of
the Convention as it was not able to coordinate and
influence the debate in the same way that the European
Parliament nominees were able to do. In this context, the
Commission’s reliance on its technical expertise is of
little use in a forum that has opted for far-reaching
strategic bargaining over substantive outcomes rather
than limit itself to more technical preparations for the
IGC. In such a politicised context the Commission had
a difficulty in overcoming the self-imposed limitations
resulting from internal divisions within the College,
and its lack of resources in the political game of Treaty
reform.
Within the Praesidium the Commission should have
been a major force – not least in that on paper the
majority of members of the Praesidium indicated their
preference for a strengthening of the Community method.
This was not been borne out in practice. The President
of the Convention and the Convention Secretariat
attempted to isolate the Commission. This was relatively
successful, partly due to the lack of support from other
members of the Praesidium who were themselves
undermined by the approach of the President of the
Convention. The negotiating style of Giscard d’Estaing
meant that the Praesidium members were, on various
occasions, not able to amend texts which they were then
been forced to defend as the common position of the
Praesidium. This left the two Commissioners in a difficult
The position of national governments
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situation, not least with the rest of the Commission
College. Towards the end of the Convention discussions
some within the Commission negotiating team even
indicated that they would rather have some of the have
some of the sensitive issues dealt with by the IGC rather
than the Convention due to the attempts to marginalise
the Commission on institutional and external relations
issues.
The Convention therefore causes a broader dilemma
for the Commission representatives: should they provide
support for the more abstract idea of the Convention
format or should they concentrate on the parochial
representation of specific Commission interests. The
Commission must decide whether to support the final
text of the Convention as it is generally acknowledged
that only with broad support will the Convention text
have a chance of adoption by the IGC. However, to do
so may mean to set aside particular interests of the
Commission on specific issues under discussion. The
Commission may well decide in its opinion and
negotiating positions in the IGC to attempt to re-open
the outcome of the Convention on articles which attempt
to undermine its institutional role and policy objectives.
There has been
little influence of the
Commission in the
Convention as a re-
sult, both in the de-
bates in the plenary
and in the work of the
Praesidium. In addi-
tion, there has been
only a limited oppor-
tunity for influencing the proceedings of the working
groups set up to prepare specific aspects of the Treaty.
Given that the Commission lacked representation in
many of these working groups, it was unable to
participate in negotiations across the board of the agenda.
This in turn hampered its ability for issue-linkage – a
capacity that had traditionally been a major asset in the
Commission’s conduct of the negotiations.
While the influence of the Commission has waned,
the role of the European Parliament and national
Parliaments has increased. They have partly taken over
the role of the Commission as the source of account-
ability from a European standpoint for the Treaty
negotiations. The Commission will need to reconsider
its role within the Convention and particularly its
position in the secretariat, the plenary, the Praesidium
and a number of working groups. It may in the future
have to decide whether it seeks to portray itself more as
the technical advisor or more the political impetus
behind the Convention approach as such.
Obviously it is early days for the Convention method,
and an ultimate judgement will depend on the outcome
of the IGC and the further evolution of the Convention
format beyond 2004. But on current evidence, it appears
that the Convention method does not particularly favour
the Commission: the greater degree of politicisation
diminishes its ability to rely on technical expertise in
influencing the course of negotiations; the greater
openness of the forum towards non-state actors and
parliamentarians detracts from its traditional role of
representing the European interest in Treaty reform; and
the explicit focus on constitutional issues makes it more
difficult to link Treaty reform to the EU policy-process
in which the Commission has such a pivotal role.
Such a development, if borne out by the evolution of the
Convention, may spell a further stage in the Com-
mission’s decline as an actor in the treaty reform process.
It mirrors the broader development in the EU where the
Commission has lost much influence in the wake of the
fall of the Santer Commission and the shift of leadership
in the Union to key Member States. The days in which
the Commission, led by Jacques Delors, could determine
the direction of Treaty change are surely distant history
at this point. Then
again, the prospect of
a new Treaty
establishing a consti-
tution enshrining the
Community method,
the rule of law and the
role of the suprana-
tional institutions in
the EU doubtlessly
constitutes a victory for the Commission and its desire
to strengthen the supranational element in the European
Union.
In conclusion, it must be recognised that the
Convention method, assuming that it is here to stay, has
fundamentally changed the business of treaty reform. It
does provide more openings for non-state actors to
influence the outcome of Treaty reform, and also has
potential for the Commission to play a more effective
role in this respect in the future. On the other hand, the
size and the dynamics of the Convention places greater
emphasis on agency, and individual actors such as the
Convention President have significant scope for
influencing the outcome and, in the process, side-lining
the Commission both as a participant in, and an object
of, Treaty reform negotiations. Future instances of Treaty
reform following the Convention model will show
whether the Commission can adapt to these changed
circumstances and play a more effective role in Treaty
reform than it has done recently.
On current evidence,
it appears that the Convention
method does not particularly
favour the Commission.18 Eipascope 2003/3 http://www.eipa.nl
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NOTES
1 See Christiansen (2002) for a more detailed argument of this
point.
2 The is ample literature on his subject. See for example Cram
(1993, 1994), Hooghe (1996) or Mazey and Richardson
(1996).
3 See Peterson (2003) for a discussion of the uncertain
prospects facing the Commission.
4 See the detailed arguments and empirical evidence provided
in the contributions to the 2002 special issue ‘Theorising
Treaty Reform’ of the Journal of European Public Policy,
edited by Gerda Falkner.
5 See Christiansen (2003) and Beach (2003) for discussions
of the role of the Council Secretariat in Treaty reform
negotiations.
6 The different levels of IGC negotiation are discussed in Gray
and Stubb (2001).
7 See Christainsen (2001) for an examination of Commission-
Council Secretariat relations, including the running of IGC
negotiations. q